Cables Obtained by WikiLeaks Shine Light Into Secret Diplomatic Channels

WASHINGTON — A cache of a quarter-million confidential American diplomatic cables, most of them from the past three years, provides an unprecedented look at back-room bargaining by embassies around the world, brutally candid views of foreign leaders and frank assessments of nuclear and terrorist threats.

Some of the cables, made available to The New York Times and several other news organizations, were written as recently as late February, revealing the Obama administration’s exchanges over crises and conflicts. The material was originally obtained by WikiLeaks, an organization devoted to revealing secret documents. WikiLeaks posted 220 cables, some redacted to protect diplomatic sources, in the first installment of the archive on its Web site on Sunday.

The disclosure of the cables is sending shudders through the diplomatic establishment, and could strain relations with some countries, influencing international affairs in ways that are impossible to predict.

Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and American ambassadors around the world have been contacting foreign officials in recent days to alert them to the expected disclosures. A statement from the White House on Sunday said: “We condemn in the strongest terms the unauthorized disclosure of classified documents and sensitive national security information.”

The White House said the release of what it called “stolen cables” to several publications was a “reckless and dangerous action” and warned that some cables, if released in full, could disrupt American operations abroad and put the work and even lives of confidential sources of American diplomats at risk. The statement noted that reports often include “candid and often incomplete information” whose disclosure could “deeply impact not only U.S. foreign policy interests, but those of our allies and friends around the world.”

The cables, a huge sampling of the daily traffic between the State Department and some 270 embassies and consulates, amount to a secret chronicle of the United States’ relations with the world in an age of war and terrorism. Among their revelations, to be detailed in The Times in coming days:

¶ A dangerous standoff with Pakistan over nuclear fuel: Since 2007, the United States has mounted a highly secret effort, so far unsuccessful, to remove from a Pakistani research reactor highly enriched uranium that American officials fear could be diverted for use in an illicit nuclear device. In May 2009, Ambassador Anne W. Patterson reported that Pakistan was refusing to schedule a visit by American technical experts because, as a Pakistani official said, “if the local media got word of the fuel removal, ‘they certainly would portray it as the United States taking Pakistan’s nuclear weapons,’ he argued.”

¶ Thinking about an eventual collapse of North Korea: American and South Korean officials have discussed the prospects for a unified Korea, should the North’s economic troubles and political transition lead the state to implode. The South Koreans even considered commercial inducements to China, according to the American ambassador to Seoul. She told Washington in February that South Korean officials believe that the right business deals would “help salve” China’s “concerns about living with a reunified Korea” that is in a “benign alliance” with the United States.

¶ Bargaining to empty the Guantánamo Bay prison: When American diplomats pressed other countries to resettle detainees, they became reluctant players in a State Department version of “Let’s Make a Deal.” Slovenia was told to take a prisoner if it wanted to meet with President Obama, while the island nation of Kiribati was offered incentives worth millions of dollars to take in Chinese Muslim detainees, cables from diplomats recounted. The Americans, meanwhile, suggested that accepting more prisoners would be “a low-cost way for Belgium to attain prominence in Europe.”

¶ Suspicions of corruption in the Afghan government: When Afghanistan’s vice president visited the United Arab Emirates last year, local authorities working with the Drug Enforcement Administration discovered that he was carrying $52 million in cash. With wry understatement, a cable from the American Embassy in Kabul called the money “a significant amount” that the official, Ahmed Zia Massoud, “was ultimately allowed to keep without revealing the money’s origin or destination.” (Mr. Massoud denies taking any money out of Afghanistan.)

¶ A global computer hacking effort: China’s Politburo directed the intrusion into Google’s computer systems in that country, a Chinese contact told the American Embassy in Beijing in January, one cable reported. The Google hacking was part of a coordinated campaign of computer sabotage carried out by government operatives, private security experts and Internet outlaws recruited by the Chinese government. They have broken into American government computers and those of Western allies, the Dalai Lama and American businesses since 2002, cables said.

¶ Mixed records against terrorism: Saudi donors remain the chief financiers of Sunni militant groups like Al Qaeda, and the tiny Persian Gulf state of Qatar, a generous host to the American military for years, was the “worst in the region” in counterterrorism efforts, according to a State Department cable last December. Qatar’s security service was “hesitant to act against known terrorists out of concern for appearing to be aligned with the U.S. and provoking reprisals,” the cable said.

Profile of the Libyan Leader

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000771

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG AND INR.

E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/29/2019
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, LY, PINR
SUBJECT: A GLIMPSE INTO LIBYAN LEADER QADHAFI'S ECCENTRICITIES

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli,
Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

1. (S/NF) Summary: Recent first-hand experiences with Libyan
Leader Muammar al-Qadhafi and his staff, primarily in
preparation for his UNGA trip, provided rare insights into
Qadhafi's inner circle and personal proclivities. Qadhafi
appears to rely heavily –– ––––– ––––– –––– –––––, and
reportedly cannot travel with his senior Ukrainian nurse, Galyna
Kolotnytska. He also appears to have an intense dislike or fear
of staying on upper floors, reportedly prefers not to fly over
water, and seems to enjoy horse racing and flamenco dancing.
His recent travel may also suggest a diminished dependence on
his legendary female guard force, as only one woman bodyguard
accompanied him to New York. End Summary.

QADHAFI'S PERSONALITY REFLECTED IN HIS PHOBIAS

2. (S/NF) Muammar al-Qadhafi has been described as both
mercurial and eccentric, and our recent first-hand experiences
with him and his office, primarily in preparation for his UNGA
trip, demonstrated the truth of both characterizations. From
the moment Qadhafi's staff began to prepare for his travel to
the United States, ––––– ––––– –– ––– ––––– –– –––––,
–––– –––––, ––– ––– –––– –– ––– –––– ––– ––– ––––– –––– of
his 40-year rule, various proclivities and phobias began to
reveal themselves in every logistical detail. When applying for
Qadhafi's visa, ––––– ––––– asked whether it was necessary
for the Leader to submit a portrait of himself that fit consular
application regulations, noting that his photo was displayed
throughout the city and that anyone of hundreds of billboards
could be photographed and shrunken to fit the application's
criteria. When the rule was enforced, ––––– –––––
reluctantly conceded to take a portrait of the Leader
specifically for the visa application.

3. (S/NF) When ––––– began to search for proper
accommodations for Qadhafi, ––––– informed us that the Leader
must stay on the first floor of any facility that was rented for
him. (––––– separately told U.S. officials in Washington that
Qadhafi could not climb more than 35 steps.) ––––– cited this
requirement as the primary reason that the Libyan residence in
New Jersey was selected as the preferred accommodation site
rather than the Libyan PermRep's residence in New York City.
––––– also sought to find accommodations with room to pitch
Qadhafi's Bedouin tent, Qadhafi's traditional site for receiving
visitors and conducting meetings, as it offers him a non-verbal
way of communicating that he is a man close to his cultural
roots.

4. (S/NF) Qadhafi's dislike of long flights and apparent fear of
flying over water also caused logistical headaches for his
staff. When discussing flight clearances with Emboffs, –––––
explained that the Libyan delegation would arrive from Portugal,
as Qadhafi "cannot fly more than eight hours" and would need to
overnight in Europe prior to continuing his journey to New York.
––––– also revealed in the same conversation that Qadhafi
does not like to fly over water. Presumably for similar
reasons, Qadhafi's staff also requested a stop in Newfoundland
to break his travel from Venezuela to Libya on September 29.
[Note: The Government of Canada recently confirmed that the
Libyan delegation canceled plans to stop in Newfoundland. End
Note.]

DEPENDENCIES: RELIANCE ON A SELECTIVE GROUP OF INDIVIDUALS

5. (S/NF) Qadhafi appears to be almost obsessively dependent on
a small core of trusted personnel. This group includes
––––– –––– –––––, ––– ––– –– ––––– ––––– ––– –––– –––
––––– ––––– ––––– –– coordinate the logistics of Qadhafi's
visit. ––––– balanced the UNGA preparations between equally
frenetic preparations for the August 31 African Union (AU)
Summit and September 1 celebration of Qadhafi's coup. –––––'–
–––– ––––– –– ––––– –––– ––––– –– ––––– –––––
––––. At large events such as the August 31 AU Summit and
September 1 celebrations, ––––– ––––– ––––– every last
detail of these complex gatherings, ranging from the overall
program to the position of the press pool. At UNGA, –––––
––––– ––––– Qadhafi to the podium at the UNGA and
––––– ––––– his papers and props upon the conclusion of
the Leader's remarks. Long-time Qadhafi Chief of Staff Bashir
Salah appears to play an equally important role in Qadhafi's
personal retinue, and ––––– ––––– –––– ––––– via an
old-fashioned green phone –– –––––'– ––––. It is next to a
red phone, which presumably connects to Qadhafi himself. We
constantly hear that National Security Adviser and son,
Muatassim, also plays a key role as his father's confidante and
handler during travel abroad. Muatassim also seems to have been
tasked with insuring that the Leader's image is well-preserved
through the full array of carefully-planned media events.

6. (S/NF) Finally, Qadhafi relies heavily on his long-time
Ukrainian nurse, Galyna Kolotnytska, who has been described as a
"voluptuous blonde." Of the rumored staff of four Ukrainian
nurses that cater to the Leader's health and well-being, –––––
––––– ––––– emphasized to multiple Emboffs that Qadhafi
cannot travel without Kolotnytska, as she alone "knows his
routine." When Kolotnytska's late visa application resulted in
her Security Advisory Opinion being received on the day
Qadhafi's party planned to travel to the U.S., the Libyan
Government sent a private jet to ferry her from Libya to
Portugal to meet up with the Leader during his rest-stop. Some
embassy contacts have claimed that Qadhafi and the 38 year-old
Kolotnytska have a romantic relationship. While he did not
comment on such rumors, a Ukrainian political officer recently
confirmed that the Ukrainian nurses "travel everywhere with the
Leader."

PREFERENCES - FROM DANCING TO HORSEMAN

7. (S/NF) In addition to the personality quirks revealed through
Qadhafi's travel to New York, the Qadhafi's preferences for
dancing and cultural performances were displayed over the last
month. The three-day spectacle of his 40th anniversary in power
included performances by dance troupes from Ukraine, Tunisia,
Algeria, Egypt, and Morocco, as well as musical performances by
bands from Mexico, Russia, New Zealand, and a number of other
nations. Qadhafi appeared particularly enthralled by Tuareg
horse racing during two of the events, clapping and smiling
throughout the races. The flamenco dancers that participated in
his celebratory events appeared to spark a similar interest, as
Qadhafi decided to stop in Seville (for a "personal trip"
according to the Spanish Ambassador here) on his way back to
Libya from Venezuela specifically to attend a flamenco dance
performance. [Note: That stop has reportedly been scrapped for
unknown reasons. End note.]

NO NEW YORK PHOTO OPS - QADHAFI LEAVES FEMALE GUARDS AT HOME

8. (S/NF) While Qadhafi's reported female guard force has become
legendary, it played no role in his travels to New York. Only
one female guard was included among the approximately 350-person
strong Libyan delegation to New York. This is the same female
bodyguard who sticks close to Qadhafi in his domestic and
international public appearances and may, in fact, play some
sort of formal security role. Observers in Tripoli speculate
that the female guard force is beginning to play a diminished
role among the Leader's personal security staff.

9. (S/NF) Comment: Qadhafi's state visits and appearances at
various conferences and summits, both at home and abroad, have
revealed greater details about his personality and character.
While it is tempting to dismiss his many eccentricities as signs
of instability, Qadhafi is a complicated individual who has
managed to stay in power for forty years through a skillful
balancing of interests and realpolitik methods. Continued
engagement with Qadhafi and his inner circle is important not
only to learn the motives and interests that drive the world's
longest serving dictator, but also to help overcome the
misperceptions that inevitably accumulated during Qadhafi's
decades of isolation. As ––––– told us, pointing to a
larger-than-life portrait of Qadhafi, "When you have been
isolated for so long, it is important to communicate." End
comment.

CRETZ
 

 

2009 Meeting with Ahmed Wali Karzai

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 003068

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM
STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA
USFOR-A FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/27/2019
TAGS: KDEM, MOPS, PGOV, PREL, AF
SUBJECT: AHMED WALI KARZAI AND GOVERNOR WEESA ON GOVERNANCE
IN KANDAHAR

Classified By: Interagency Provincial Affairs Deputy Coordinator Hoyt Y
ee for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

1. (C) Summary: in a lengthy and cordial introductory meeting
with Kandahar Provincial Council Chief Ahmed Wali Karzai
(AWK) and Governor Tooryalai Weesa, Senior Civilian
Representative (SCR) for the South Frank Ruggiero underscored
the need for improved governance in Kandahar, and highlighted
the importance of naming credible provincial governors and
district officials before the inauguration to send a positive
signal on good governance to the Afghan people and the
international community. Both AWK and Weesa acknowledged the
weakness of the government in Kandahar, and outlined their
proposals for local solutions, including the empowerment of
shuras of district elders for local dispute resolution rather
than the courts. AWK also emphasized large-scale
infrastructure projects rather than smaller cash-for-work
program, and his desire to see private security companies in
the province under one licensee. AWK discounted the role of
elections and their importance to Afghans. End Summary.

AWK Nervous but Eager to Share Views
----------------------------------

2. (C) SCR Ruggiero met with AWK and Governor Weesa on
September 28 in the Governor's Palace in Kandahar City. The
Representative of Canada in Kandahar (RoCK) Ben Rowswell also
attended the meeting, which was held in a wood-paneled room,
beneath a large photo of President Hamid Karzai. (Note:
While we must deal with AWK as the head of the Provincial
Council, he is widely understood to be corrupt and a
narcotics trafficker. End Note) AWK, dressed in a crisp
white shalwar kameez and pinstriped vest, appeared nervous,
though eager to express his views on the international
presence in Kandahar.

The Importance of Good Governance
------------------------------

3. (C) SCR emphasized the criticality of good governance in
the province, and said the United States would like to see
improvement in the post-election period. He said the United
States is ready to work with the GIRoA to strengthen key
provincial and district level governance, but we are only
willing to expend our resources in people and programs if we
have confidence those resources will pay off and make a real
difference.

4. (C) Both AWK and Weesa acknowledged there was a
credibility gap between the public and the government. Weesa
said it was a problem that in the 10 months he had been in
office, the government had not been able to deliver 24-hour
electricity to the people, and that 150 factories had closed
because of it. He said people looked to NGOs more than to
the government to deliver services, and he complained that
NGOs poach workers from the government by offering higher
wages. SCR emphasized the importance of naming credible
provincial governors and district officials before the
inauguration to send a positive signal on good governance to
the Afghan people and the international community.

5. (C) AWK suggested one way of fighting corruption in the
province would be to re-establish and empower district
shuras, instead of judges or police, to settle local
disputes. Currently there is only one judge for the five
districts around Kandahar City, he said, and a council of
local elders would be more effective at resolving land, water
and other disputes. (Note: there are a total of seven judges
for all 17 districts in the province.) "You can easily bribe
the chief of police or a judge,8 he said, &but you can't
bribe 50 elders." He said the provincial council, with the
support of the governor, could initiate the formation of
these district shuras, which would consist of 10-15 elders
elected by the people.

Infrastructure Priorities, Private Security Contractors and
Conflicts of Interest
--------------------------------------------- -----------------

6. (C) AWK said he had been in Kandahar almost continuously
since 1992, and that the U.S. reputation in the province was
built on the back of two key infrastructure projects done in
the 1950s and 60s. He said what would make a difference to
the population today would be similar large-scale,
labor-intensive projects that would provide jobs to the
people and keep them from being recruited by the Taliban.
AWK cautioned against the use of small scale projects and

KABUL 00003068 002 OF 002

additional cash-for-work programs; he stated that the use of
implementing partners does not allow expenditure of
development resources to reach villagers and other local
Afghans. Both he and Weesa added that it should be the local
elders who are empowered to distribute these jobs, not
officials or companies from outside.

Putting Private Security Under the Direction of the
Provincial Council
--------------------------------------------- --

7. (C) In the same vein of providing "local solutions to
local problems," as he put it, AWK recommended a "local
solution" to the problem of providing security in the area.
He said that currently, there are many jihadi commanders with
militias who independently provide protection to convoys and
projects, but that a proposal before the Ministry of Interior
would bring all these commanders under one umbrella in
Kandahar, with one person given the license for the private
security sector. He said there would be a meeting Wednesday
(September 30) of all the security companies, under the
auspices of the Provincial Council, to appoint this
representative to send to Kabul. (Note: AWK is understood to
have a stake in private security contracting, and has
aggressively lobbied the Canadians to have his security
services retained for the Dahla Dam refurbishment. Both he
and the governor have tried to exert control over how
contracts are awarded in the province ) all of which could
be a significant conflict of interest in the province. End
Note.)

Elections: What's the Point?
---------------------

8. (C) In answer to a question from the RoCK and the SCR
about the credibility of the elections, AWK said democracy
was new for Afghanistan, and that people in the region did
not understand the point of having one election, let alone
two. "The people do not like change," he said. "They think,
the President is alive, and everything is fine. Why have an
election?"

Comment
-----

9. (C) The meeting with AWK highlights one of our major
challenges in Afghanistan: how to fight corruption and
connect the people to their government, when the key
government officials are themselves corrupt. Given AWK's
reputation for shady dealings, his recommendations for large,
costly infrastructure projects should be viewed with a
healthy dose of skepticism. Still, his observations about
the unintended consequences of how NGOs and other
international partners do their work, e.g. "poaching" of
government staff, track with some of our own concerns,
including about how to promote Afghan-led solutions. We will
continue to urge AWK to improve his own credibility gap as
well as that of the GIRoA.
EIKENBERRY
 

WikiLeaks documents reveal Arab states' anxiety over Iran

http://www.cnn.com/2010/US/11/28/us.wikileaks.iran/index.html?hpt=T2

(CNN) -- U.S. diplomatic cables obtained by the website WikiLeaks and published by newspapers in the United States and Europe on Sunday reveal considerable anxiety among the Gulf states about Iran's nuclear program, with the Bahrain's king warning, "The danger of letting it go on is greater than the danger of stopping it."

The cables, many marked "Secret," were among several hundred thousand obtained by WikiLeaks and published by newspapers Sunday.

They reveal great concern among Arab states about Iran's regional ambitions. One cable describes a meeting between Saudi King Abdullah and White House counterterrorism adviser John Brennan and other U.S. officials in March 2009.

According to the cable, the king told the Americans what he had just told the Iranian foreign minister, Manouchehr Mottaki. "You as Persians have no business meddling in Arab matters," the Saudi monarch was quoted as telling Mottaki. "Iran's goal is to cause problems," he told Brennan. "There is no doubt something unstable about them."

The king was also highly critical of the Iraqi Prime Minister, Nuri al Maliki. He is reported to have told his American visitors: "I don't trust this man.... he's an Iranian agent." The cable continues: "The King said he had told both (former U.S. President George W.) Bush and former Vice President (Dick) Cheney: 'How can I meet with someone I don't trust?'"

King Abdullah also welcomed the election of President Barack Obama. "Thank God for bringing Obama to the presidency," he is reported as saying, adding that it had created "great hope" in the Muslim world.

According to another cable, King Hamadbin Isa al-Khalifa of Bahrain told the commander of U.S. Central Command, Gen. David H. Petraeus, that Iran was the "source of much of the trouble in both Iraq and Afghanistan."

The cable, sent in November 2009 by the U.S. ambassador in Bahrain, added that the king had "argued forcefully for taking action to terminate their nuclear program, by whatever means necessary. 'That program must be stopped,' he said.

Another cable reveals that in the neighboring United Arab Emirates, Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan told a congressional delegation last February that "if Iran goes nuclear, others in the region will move forward on the same track, and the nuclear nonproliferation treaty will completely break down."

According to a cable about the meeting sent by the U.S. ambassador on February 22, the minister added that "a crisis or confrontation in the region would create oil supply problems worldwide."

There was similar apprehension in Egypt about Iran. In a cable sent in February 2009, the U.S. ambassador in Cairo recounted: "President Mubarak told Senator Mitchell during his recent visit here that he did not oppose our talking with the Iranians, as long as 'you don't believe a word they say.'"

The cable referred to former Sen. George Mitchell, the Obama administration's special Middle East envoy.

According to the cable, the ambassador continued: "Mubarak has a visceral hatred for the Islamic Republic, referring repeatedly to Iranians as 'liars,' and denouncing them for seeking to destabilize Egypt and the region."

A cable from the U.S. ambassador in Oman, meanwhile, quotes the country's Armed Forces Chief, Lt. Gen. Ali bin Majidal-Ma'amari, as saying that "with Iran's continued attitude on the nuclear issue, the security situation in Iraq would remain unresolved."

Citing Oman's preference for a non-military solution, he nevertheless acknowledged that a nuclear-armed Iran as opposed to war with Iran posed "an extremely difficult dilemma for all of us," the cable continued.

There is advice in another cable about to handle Iran.

According to a readout of a November 2007 briefing from the then-British ambassador in Tehran, Geoffrey Adams, the UK envoy had "recommended being steady and firm, tough but not aggressive, and at the same time, seeking to engage."

The cable says: "He stressed that Iranians are obsessed with the West and this obsession at times blinds them to their interests."

 

Saudi King: US Should Plant Chips in Gitmo Detainees.

By Full US Embassy Cable

http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article26928.htm

Posted November 28, 2010

xSunday, 22 March 2009, 10:14
S E C R E T RIYADH 000447
NSC FOR JBRENNAN AND JDUNCAN; STATE FOR S/WCI
EO 12958 DECL: 03/16/2019
TAGS PREL, PTER, KWBG, SA, AF, IN, PK, IR, IZ
SUBJECT: COUNTERTERRORISM ADVISER BRENNAN'S MEETING WITH
SAUDI KING ABDULLAH
REF: RIYADH 427
Classified By: Pol Counselor Lisa Carle, 1.4(b),(d)

1. KEY POINTS

-- (S) Saudi King Abdullah welcomed White House counterterrorism adviser John Brennan, S/WCI Ambassador Williamson, and Ambassador Fraker to his private palace March 15 for a 90-minute discussion focused on U.S. Saudi-relations, counterterrorism cooperation, the Yemeni Guantanamo Bay detainees, Iran, and Iraq.

-- (S) Brennan presented the King with a letter from President Obama expressing a personal message of friendship, appreciation for our close and collaborative relationship and concern over the disposition of Yemeni detainees at Guantanamo.

-- (S) The King said he had told Iranian Foreign Minister Mottaki only minutes before that Iran should stop interfering in Arab affairs, and had given Iran a one-year deadline to improve its relations with Saudi Arabia.

-- (S) The King expressed a complete lack of trust in Iraqi PM al-Maliki and held out little hope for improved Saudi/Iraqi relations as long as al-Maliki remains in office.

-- (S) When asked what advice he had for President Obama, the King said he had "one request": that it was "critically important to restore America's credibility" in the world.

U.S. SAUDI RELATIONS

2. (S) PLEDGES OF FRIENDSHIP: Brennan asserted that the U.S./Saudi alliance must remain strong, and assured the King of President Obama's wishes for a long and healthy U.S./Saudi relationship, and the President's personal commitment that Saudi Arabia had a friend in the White House. The King replied that he appreciated the sentiments and that he had great respect for President Obama. "We (the U.S. and Saudi Arabia) spilled blood together" in Kuwait and Iraq, the King continued, and Saudi Arabia valued this tremendously. Friendship can be a difficult issue that requires work, Abdullah said, but the U.S. and Saudi Arabia have done it for 70 years over three generations. "Our disagreements don,t cut to the bone," he stated.

3. (S) U.S. CREDIBILITY IS CRITICAL: The Bush Administration is now in the past, the King said. Both President Bushes were his friends, but the recent President Bush didn,t take his advice on dealing with issues in the region, and they found their problems "compounded." The King said, "we are ready to consult, provide guidance and to do whatever is necessary. We are people of the region and we know it well." Brennan responded that President Obama wants to listen, and asked what advice the King would offer to President Obama. Abdullah said his one piece of advice was that restoring U.S. credibility in the world was critically important. Brennan responded that this was an important issue for President Obama as well. Brennan said that under President Obama we will restore our credibility. He said the U.S. is a great country and we know what we have to do.

4. (S) THE WORLD NEEDS OBAMA: Brennan said President Obama looked forward to seeing the King at the G-20 summit in London. "Thank God for bringing Obama to the presidency," the King answered, which has created "great hope" in the Muslim world. "May God grant him strength and patience, Abdullah continued, "May God protect him. I'm concerned about his personal safety. America and the world need such a president."

5. (C) THAT WITHOUT WHICH NO SAUDI MEETING IS COMPLETE: Abdullah said "as a friend" that "it was a mistake" to limit access of Saudi citizens to the U.S., since "this damages bilateral relations and the image of the U.S. in Saudi Arabia." The King noted there were 60,000 Saudi students abroad, about one third of whom were in the U.S., and "others would have gone" but for the difficulties in gaining access to the U.S. The King noted that for many years very senior Saudi officials, including Prince Saud al-Faisal, had studied in the U.S. He then noted that Saudi Ambassador to the U.S., Adel al Jubeir (who was interpreting for the King) had studied in the U.S. and was "half American" as a result. He also said he was aware of, and appreciated, Ambassador Fraker's efforts to improve the visa situation "even though there were people in Washington who fought him." Finally, he observed that anyone from Saudi Arabia who studies in the U.S. inevitably becomes a friend and advocate of the United States and that we only hurt ourselves by cutting off this flow of students.

DETAINEES

6. (S) GUANTANAMO WILL BE CLOSED: Brennan explained that President Obama had made a commitment to close Guantanamo to eliminate the potential propaganda benefits its existence provided to Al-Qaeda, but also because it was the right thing to do. Brennan reassured the King, however, that President Obama would remain strong on counterterrorism. Brennan presented the King with a letter from President Obama addressing the issue of Yemeni detainees at Guantanamo. Brennan noted that he had met with Prince Mohammed bin Nayef (MbN) the day before to discuss at length The issue of the Yemeni detainees. Brennan further stated that he would be traveling to Sanaa the next day to meet with President Saleh, as the issue of the remaining 99 Yemeni detainees still needed to be resolved. Brennan praised MbN as an outstanding counterterrorism partner, and that the MOI was doing a wonderful, courageous job in countering the terrorist threat to the Kingdom. Returning to the subject later in the conversation, Brennan warned that the U.S. feared Yemen could become another Waziristan, and urged that the U.S. and Saudi Arabia needed to work together to keep Al-Qaeda in Yemen from growing even more dangerous. The King replied that having Somalia next door to Yemen only adds to the danger. Brennan said that the capabilities of the Ministry of the Interior security forces had grown impressively over the past 10 years. Brennan added that counterterrorism and intelligence sharing cooperation between our countries had never been better and that MbN deserved the credit. In an unusual concession, made at the conclusion of their conversation, the King said, "be assured I am fully briefed on the work you are doing with Prince Mohammed bin Nayef."

7. (S) HOW TO TRACK DETAINEES: "I've just thought of something," the King added, and proposed implanting detainees with an electronic chip containing information about them and allowing their movements to be tracked with Bluetooth. This was done with horses and falcons, the King said. Brennan replied, "horses don,t have good lawyers," and that such a proposal would face legal hurdles in the U.S., but agreed that keeping track of detainees was an extremely important issue that he would review with appropriate officials when he returned to the United States.

IRAN

8. (S) A "HEATED EXCHANGE": The King noted that Iranian FM Mottaki had been "sitting in that same seat (as Brennan) a few moments ago." The King described his conversation with FM Mottaki as "a heated exchange, frankly discussing Iran's interference in Arab affairs." When challenged by the King on Iranian meddling in Hamas affairs, Mottaki apparently protested that "these are Muslims." "No, Arabs" countered the King, "You as Persians have no business meddling in Arab matters." The King said the Iranians wanted to improve relations and that he responded by giving Mottaki an ultimatum. "I will give you one year" (to improve ties), "after that, it will be the end."

9. (S) "SPARE US YOUR EVIL": The King expressed hope the U.S. would review its Iran policy and "come to the right conclusion." Brennan responded that President Obama was personally reviewing U.S. Iran policy and wanted to hear the King's thoughts. Abdullah asserted that Iran is trying to set up Hizballah-like organizations in African countries, observing that the Iranians don't think they are doing anything wrong and don't recognize their mistakes. "I said (to Mottaki) that's your problem," recounted the King. Abdullah said he would favor Rafsanjani in an Iranian election, were he to run. He described Iran not as "a neighbor one wants to see," but as "a neighbor one wants to avoid." He said the Iranians "launch missiles with the hope of putting fear in people and the world." A solution to the Arab/Israeli conflict would be a great achievement, the King said, but Iran would find other ways to cause trouble. "Iran's goal is to cause problems," he continued, "There is no doubt something unstable about them." He described Iran as "adventurous in the negative sense," and declared "May God prevent us from falling victim to their evil." Mottaki had tendered an invitation to visit Iran, but Abdullah said he replied "All I want is for you to spare us your evil." Summarizing his history with Iran, Abdullah concluded: "We have had correct relations over the years, but the bottom line is that they cannot be trusted."

10. (S) AN EMPTY CHANNEL: The King said "three years ago" Iranian Supreme Leader Khamenei had sent his adviser Ali Akbar Velayati with a letter asking for Abdullah's agreement to establish a formal back channel for communication between the two leaders. Abdullah said he had agreed, and the channel was established with Velayati and Saudi FM Saud al-Faisal as the points of contact. In the years since, the King noted, the channel had never been used.

11. (S) A DANGEROUS NEIGHBORHOOD: Brennan responded that the Saudis lived in a dangerous neighborhood with Iran across the Gulf, with Saudi Arabia sharing a long border with Yemen, and with a number of other troublesome countries nearby. Brennan noted that we have a lot of work to do in the Middle East together. The King responded that the world,s attention was focused on the region. He further stated that he believed that the U.S. could help in this sensitive region, but that we should not take matters lightly. Brennan noted that President Obama is fully aware of the dangers in the region, that the U.S. knew that it had to remain involved in constructing a solution, and that we would seek the King,s counsel in dealing with the many issues in the Middle East. The King asked if that included Iran. Brennan responded that it did. Brennan said that we had our eyes wide open to Iranian ambitions, that we were not nave to the dangers Iran posed to Saudi Arabia, and that Iran could not be allowed to succeed in its destabilizing activites. Brennan observed that the President had ordered a complete review of U.S. Iran policy and made reference to a passage in the President,s letter that we needed to test Iran,s intentions to cease its destabilizing behavior and live up to its international obligations. Brennan further observed that the U.S.-Saudi partnership had to remain strong and that together, and with others, we needed to thwart Iran,s nuclear ambitions. "That is important," responded the King. Finally, Brennan said the President wanted the King to know he had a good friend in the White House who would be willing to assist in any way that he could. The King thanked Mr. Brennan, said he appreciated the sentiments, said that he had great respect for President Obama, and reflected that we had been great friends for many years and would remain friends as our disagreements were minor.

12. (U) SEE REFTEL: Ref A provided a separate readout on the Iran discussion and the King's meeting with Mottaki.

IRAQ

13. (S) IN THE HANDS OF GOD AND IRAN: Brennan expressed the importance the U.S. attaches to achieving peace and stability in Iraq. The King replied that this was "in the hands of God," though he agreed that Iraq was vitally important to both the U.S. and Saudi Arabia. The King also pointed out that "some say the U.S. invasion handed Iraq to Iran on a silver platter; this after we fought Saddam Hussein."

14. (S) NO HOPE FOR MALIKI: The King said he had "no confidence whatsoever in (Iraqi PM) Maliki, and the Ambassador (Fraker) is well aware of my views." The King affirmed that he had refused former President Bush's entreaties that he meet with Maliki. The King said he had met Maliki early in Maliki's term of office, and the Iraqi had given him a written list of commitments for reconciliation in Iraq, but had failed to follow through on any of them. For this reason, the King said, Maliki had no credibility. "I don,t trust this man," the King stated, "He's an Iranian agent." The King said he had told both Bush and former Vice president Cheney "how can I meet with someone I don,t trust?" Maliki has "opened the door for Iranian influence in Iraq" since taking power, the King said, and he was "not hopeful at all" for Maliki, "or I would have met with him."

AN ALERT AND ENGAGING HOST

15. (S) I MISS MY HORSES: The King appeared alert and at times animated, entertaining his guests with anecdotes about his encounters with Iranian leaders (septel), and throwing up his hands in complaint when asked if he spent time with his horses: "I see them on television when they race," he said. "I love horses," he exclaimed, "every couple of weeks I get to see them, and then I have a very calm and restful sleep."

16. (S) DIALOGUE AND REFORM AS DUTY: In response to Brennan,s praise for the King,s interfaith dialogue initiative, his commitment to advancing rights as reflected by his recent appointment of the first female (deputy education) minister, the King said "Thanks for the sentiment but I did nothing special, only what I thought was my duty. I believe we do our duty as determined by God."

17. (S) PARTICIPANTS:

Saudi Arabia -- Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz al-Saud -- HRH Prince Mohammed bin Nayef bin Abdulaziz al-Saud, Assistant Minister of the Interior -- Ambassador to the U.S. Adel al-Jubeir (interpreter)

U.S. -- John Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism -- Ambassador Ford Fraker -- Ambassador-at-large for War Crimes Issues Clint Williamson -- John Duncan, NSC Director for Counterterrorism -- Shaun Coughlin, Special Assistant, S/WCI -- Embassy control officer/notetaker

18. (U) Assistant to the President Brennan cleared this cable.

FRAKER

 

Wikileaks: Israel Assessed Abbas as Weak, Unpopular

http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article26940.htm

By AFP

November 29, 2010 "-- JERUSALEM (AFP) -- Senior Israeli defense and political figures described President Mahmoud Abbas as weak, unpopular and unlikely to survive politically past 2011, leaked US diplomatic cables showed on Monday.

In meetings with US representatives, Israeli officials ranging from then-opposition leader Benjamin Netanyahu, to senior defense official Amos Gilad expressed doubt about Abbas's political longevity.

"It was widely agreed that President Abbas is currently in a weakened political state, and Israeli officials generally cast a dour assessment of Abbas's future," said one cable, recounting details of a 2009 meeting between US assistant defense secretary Alexander Vershbow and Israeli defense officials.

"In one exchange, Amos Gilad stated his opinion that Abbas will not survive politically past the year 2011," the cable said.

Gilad, a senior policy official at the defense ministry, added that the "government of Israel has little faith in the Palestinian negotiating team."

The cables are part of a massive release of US embassy dispatches by whistleblower website WikiLeaks, which has so far published just several hundred of the reported quarter million US diplomatic cables it has obtained.

The files show Israel's long-standing assessment of Abbas as a weak figurehead unable to stand up to his political rivals, militant group Hamas.

In 2007, then-opposition leader and current Prime Minister Netanyahu told US lawmaker Gary Ackerman that Abbas was a "nice man who means well," but that Israeli and US efforts would be better focused on undermining Hamas.

"Without elaborating, Netanyahu said it would be easier to weaken Hamas than to strengthen Abbas," the cable from the US embassy in Tel Aviv said.

And in June 2007, Mossad director Meir Dagan told then-US homeland security advisor Frances Townsend that Abbas's Fatah party was so deeply unpopular that Israel was essentially propping up his regime.

"Only Israeli military operations against Hamas in the West Bank prevent them from expanding control beyond Gaza, lamented Dagan, without which Fatah would fall within one month and Abbas would join his 'mysteriously wealthy' son in Qatar," the cable said.

"Although he expressed his personal faith in Salam Fayyad, Dagan said that the Palestinian prime minister had no power base. Fatah as a party would have to completely reorganise itself in order to regain credibility, argued Dagan, but instead they have turned once again to the 'old guard.'"

On Monday, chief Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erekat criticized the reports of Dagan's remarks, saying the comments were "attempts to discredit the president, which raise a big question mark over the level of trust between us and them."

 

 

[ Muslim Dictators] [ Home ]   [ Site Map ]